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THE IRS'S FLAWED SOLUTION TO THE
CONTROVERSY OVER DEDUCTIBLE
CLAIMS AGAINST THE ESTATE AND THE
NECESSITY FOR A DATE-OF-DEATH
STANDARD
LISA K. JOHNSON*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Does it matter where you die? Under the current law, tax
professionals and the Internal Revenue Service ("Service") would
answer the question in the affirmative: that where one dies can
make a significant difference in the amount of assets that remains
in the decedent's estate. As the law stands, differing standards
across the country lead to inconsistent valuations of decedents'
estates.' To some estates, this difference could mean millions.
Current estate tax law imposes a tax on the transfer of the
taxable estate upon death. 2 The taxable estate, defined by
Internal Revenue Code (the "Code") section 2051, 3 is the decedent's
"net" estate, a separate concept from the "gross" estate. 4 Pursuant
to sections 2031 through 2045 of the Code, the gross estate
includes the value of all property in which the decedent had an
interest at the time of death. 5 The Code also provides for a

* J.D. candidate May 2009, The John Marshall Law School. The Author would
like to thank the 2008-09 and 2009-10 Law Review Editorial Boards for their
dedication to the Law Review and meticulous editing of this Comment. The
Author also wishes to thank Elizabeth Schutte for her advice and mentorship
throughout the writing process. The Author would like to dedicate this
Comment to her parents, Mark and Risa Johnson, for their unconditional
support and guidance in life and throughout her educational career.
1. Jeffrey M. Loeb, Crossed Circuits on Estate Tax Deductibility of
Disputed or Contingent Claims, 12 CAL. TR. & EST. Q. 6, 6 (2006) (discussing
the complex history of the split among the circuit courts of appeals regarding
deductible claims against the estate).
2. I.R.C. § 2001(a) (2006). This section provides that "[a] tax is hereby
imposed on the transfer of the taxable estate of every decedent who is a citizen
or resident of the United States." Id.
3. I.R.C. § 2051.
4. REGIS W. CAMPFIELD ET AL., TAXATION OF ESTATES, GIFT AND TRUSTS
25,001 (23d ed. 2006).
5. I.R.C. §§ 2031-2045. According to Treasury Regulation 20.2033-1(a),
"the gross estate of a decedent [includes] ...the value of all property, whether
real or personal, tangible or intangible, and wherever situated, beneficially
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number of deductions 6 that reduce the gross estate to a net figure,
known as the taxable estate. 7 This net amount is then subject to
the federal estate tax. Despite the purpose of the Code to ensure
the uniform application of estate tax laws throughout the nation,
the inconsistent interpretations of section 20538 of the Code have
led to the disparate treatment of similarly situated estates.
Internal Revenue Code section 2053(a) permits estate tax
deductions for "claims against the estate" that are "allowable by
the laws of the jurisdiction ... under which the estate is being
administered." 9 Notably, section 2053(a) does not reference the
10
The
date for valuing such claims against a decedent's estate.

owned by the decedent at the time of his death." Property is included in the
gross estate at its fair market value (subject to exceptions) upon the decedent's
date of death under section 2031 unless the executor of the decedent's will
elects to value the property on the alternative valuation date under section
2032. I.R.C. §§ 2031-32.
6. I.R.C. § 2053, the topic of this Comment, allows a deduction for claims
against the estate. I.R.C. § 2054 allows a deduction for casualty and theft
losses incurred during the settlement of the estate. I.R.C. § 2055 allows a
deduction for charitable transfers. I.R.C. § 2056 allows a deduction for marital
transfers. I.R.C. § 2057 allows a deduction for the adjusted value of the
qualified family-owned business interests of the decedent. I.R.C. § 2058 allows
a deduction for state death taxes.
7. The rationale for the deductions allowable under sections 2051 through
2058 is to eliminate from estate taxation those portions of the gross estate that
are expended in paying expenses of the estate. Because these expended
portions are not transferred to the decedent's beneficiaries or heirs, they are
intended to be excluded from the estate transfer tax. See Prop. Reg. §
20.2053(1-9), 72 Fed. Reg. 20080-87 (2007) (explaining the new provisions of
section 2053 under the proposed amendments); see also Propstra v. United
States, 680 F.2d 1248, 1250 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that:
[blecause the estate tax is a tax on the privilege of transferring property
upon one's death, the property to be valued for estate tax purposes is
that which the decedent actually transfers at his death rather than the
interest held by the decedent before death or that held by the legatee
after death).
8. I.R.C. § 2053(a)(3).
9. Id. The entire language of section 2053(a) includes:
[flor purposes of the tax imposed by section 2001, the value of the
taxable estate shall be determined by deducting from the value of the
gross estate such amounts: (1) for funeral expenses, (2) for
administration expenses, (3) for claims against the estate, and (4) for
unpaid mortgages on, or any indebtedness in respect of, property where
the value of the decedent's interest therein, undiminished by such
mortgage or indebtedness, is included in the value of the gross estate, as
are allowable by the laws of the jurisdiction, whether within or without
the United States, under which the estate is being administered.
I.R.C. § 2053(a).
10. See Anthony Vecino, Section 2053 and the Extent to Which Post-Death
Events Should Be Considered in Determining the Value of a Taxable Estate,
CAL. TAX LAW., Winter 2007, at 14 (explaining that the current statutory
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applicable Treasury regulation explains that deductible claims
against the estate must "represent personal obligations of the
decedent existing at the time of his death, whether or not then
matured."'1 Another Treasury regulation, however, provides that
an item may be deducted even though its exact amount is not then
known, provided it is ascertainable with reasonable certainty and
will be paid. 12 These two regulations are arguably contradictory 13
and, therefore, offer little guidance regarding the date on which
claims should be valued.1 4 This lack of direction has led to
inconsistencies among the circuit courts of appeals and two vastly
different schools of thought on the matter. 15
To better understand the consequences of the conflicting
judicial interpretations, consider the following illustration.
Pamela Patient files a malpractice lawsuit against Donald Doctor
for three million dollars.
Shortly thereafter, Donald dies
unexpectedly, leaving the dispute unresolved.
Using expert
appraisals of the claim, Donald's executor takes a two million

authority gives very little guidance on whether to consider postmortem events
in determining the value of the taxable estate); see also Fran M. DeMaris, IRS
Issues Proposed Regs. Regarding Estate Tax Deductions Under I.R. C. § 2053,
CANNON

FIN.

INST.,

INC.,

May

15,

2007,

http://www.cannonfinancial.com/news/newsDetail.cfm?ID=134 (discussing the
history leading to the inconsistent treatment of estates under section 2053).
11. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-4 (1958).
12. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-1(b)(3) (as amended in 1972); see also Estate of
Hester v. United States, No. 5:06-cv-00041, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14834, at
*14 (W.D. Va. Mar. 2, 2007) (holding that no deduction was allowed under
section 2053(a) because the estate had neither an actual or expected claimant
nor a cognizable claim).
13. Section 20.2053-4 seems to favor a date-of-death valuation, while
section 20.2053-1(b)(3) appears to require courts to consider postmortem
events. See Benjamin Clark Brown, Life After Death? The Role of Postmortem
Events in CalculatingDeductions for Claims Against Estates, 60 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 579, 584 (2003) (analyzing the components of the debate regarding
postmortem events that should play a role in valuing deductions).
14. Id. at 583.
15. See Roger McEowen, IRS Issues Proposed Regulations Providing
Guidance on How Post-Death Events Impact Taxable Estate Value, AG
DECISION MAKER, Iowa St. Un., 2007, http://www.extension.iastate.
edu/AgDMlarticles/mceowen/McEowClApr07b.html
(discussing the history
behind the two lines of reasoning that developed in the circuit courts). As a
result of the silence by the regulations, executors lack a definite rule
controlling the value of such deductions. Consequently, this leads to litigation
that "drains precious IRS resources that are already severely strained." See
Brown, supra note 13, at 583 (discussing the problems resulting from the
regulations' lack of clarity relating to deductible claims against the estate); see
also Albert B. Crenshaw, IRS Lacks Resources it Needs, Departing
Commissioner Says, WASH. POST., Oct. 11, 2002, at E4 (commenting on the
tight budgets preventing the Service from hiring professionals to find
unreported income and over-stated deductions).
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dollar estate tax deduction under section 2053 as a claim against
the estate. Donald's estate eventually settles with Pamela for one
million dollars.
If Donald's estate was administered within the jurisdiction of
the Fifth Circuit, the two million dollar deduction would be
permissible as a date-of-death valuation of the claim against the
estate. 16 But if the estate was administered within the Eighth
Circuit, 17 the estate would not be permitted to take a deduction for
the amount of the disputed liability. Instead, the estate would be
permitted to take a deduction only for the one million dollar
amount that was actually paid. This illustration demonstrates
that the differing standards among the circuit courts promote
inconsistent applications of estate tax law.
Recognizing the issue, in April 2007, the Treasury
Department and the Internal Revenue Service issued Proposed
Regulations, 18 which seek to clarify section 2053.19 The Proposed
Regulations attempt to resolve the problem by setting rules that
would govern situations where the precise amount of the estate's
20
liability is uncertain at the date of death.
This Comment seeks to analyze the Proposed Regulations and
offers an alternative method for valuing deductible claims against
the estate. Part II will explore the judicial history of relevant case
law and identify reasons for the split decisions from the circuit
courts of appeals. Part III will discuss the relevant sections of the
Proposed Regulations and analyze their potential shortcomings.
More specifically, it will examine the effects of the Proposed
Regulations and their failure to adequately address the problems
of the current Code. Part IV will propose that a date-of-death
valuation approach will create a more efficient and equitable
solution to the current inequities in the estate tax system.

II. BACKGROUND
There are two leading, but considerably different, views
among the circuit courts of appeals as to the deductibility under
I.R.C. § 2053(a) of disputed or contingent claims against the

16. The deduction of the appraised amount of two million dollars is
permissible regardless of the fact that Donald's estate actually paid only one
million dollars. See infra text accompanying notes 50-57 (discussing the Fifth
Circuit's adherence to the date-of-death valuation standard).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 36-41 (discussing the Eighth
Circuit's consideration of postmortem events in valuing claims against the
estate).
18. See Prop. Regs. §§ 20.2053(1-9), 72 Fed. Reg. 20080-87 (explaining the
new provisions of § 2053 under the Service's proposed amendments).

19. I.R.C. § 2053.
20. Prop. Regs. §§ 20.2053(1-9), 72 Fed. Reg. 20080-87.
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decedent's estate. 21 One side of the split follows the policy that a
decedent's estate may not deduct the date-of-death value of a
disputed or contingent claim, but must pay the full estate taxes,
await resolution of the claim, and then seek a tax refund. 22 On the
other side, a decedent's estate may deduct the date-of-death value
of a disputed or contingent adverse claim, 2 leaving the Service
with the opportunity to challenge the amount of the deduction in
the event that postmortem events significantly alter the
24
deduction.
The discrepancies in the circuit court rulings have led to an
unseemly lack of consistency among tax courts, resulting in
disparate treatment of similarly situated estates. 25 In certain
circuits, the date-of-death value of the deduction allowable to
taxpayers for disputed or contingent claims may end up being
greater than the amount actually paid to resolve the claim. 26
Conversely, in circuits that allow postmortem events to be
considered, the amount of the taxpayer's deduction is based
entirely on the amount ultimately paid postmortem to resolve the
disputed or contingent claim.2 7 The discrepancy has prompted one
court to assert that the issue "is so readily susceptible to and so
obviously yearning for legislative clarification." 28

21. Steve R. Akers, Proposed Regulations Limiting Estate Tax Deductions
for Uncertain Claims Against Decedents and Other Administration Expenses
under § 2053, ILL. ST. B. ASS'N SEC. TR. & EST., Sept. 2007, at 1, available at
http://www.isba.org/Sections/ trustsestates/9-07.pdf.
22. Loeb, supra note 1, at 6.
23. Id.
24. I.R.C. § 6501 provides that the Service has three years from the date
the estate tax return is filed to assess a tax on an estate. If an estate remains
unsettled beyond this date because of disputed or contingent claims, the
Service must issue a notice of deficiency to preserve any claim for
underpayment it may have. I.R.C. § 6501(a).
25. See Akers, supra note 21, at 2 (describing discrepancies in circuit court
rulings); see also Jay Cloud, Proposed Regulations Under 2053: The IRS
Proposed Changes to the Method for Determining Deductions for Claims
Against an Estate, TENN. B. ASS'N SEC. EST. PLAN. & PROB., May 2007,
available
at
http://www.tba.org/sections/EstateLaw/newsletters/estate
05_21_07.htm#Anchor-Fourth-35882 (summarizing the Service's proposed
amendments to § 2053); DeMaris, supra note 10 (noting the inconsistencies
that have developed as a result of the lack of direction from the applicable
regulations).
26. Akers, supra note 21, at 2.
27. Id.
28. Green v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 885, 894 (E.D. Ill. 1978). Others
have suggested that "this is an area ripe for litigation with the IRS." Francis
J. Antonucci & Robert Whitman, After Death Tax Planning:Minimizing Tax
Liabilities,2004 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 118.
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The split among the circuit courts of appeals stems from the
seminal case on the subject of deductibility of claims29-Ithaca
Trust v. Commissioner,30 a 1929 United States Supreme Court
decision. In Ithaca Trust, the decedent made a gift to his wife of a
life estate in the residue of his estate with the remainder passing
to charity. 31 The issue before the Court was whether the amount
of the testator's charitable deduction should be calculated by
valuing the gift to charity on the decedent's date of death, reduced
by the value of the wife's estate (to be determined upon her death)
or by mortality tables showing the probabilities as they stood on
the day when the testator died. 32 The Court ruled that "the value
of the thing to be taxed must be estimated as of the time when the
act is done." 33
This ruling established a clear rule that
postmortem events were not to be considered in the valuation of
deductions for charitable contributions.3 4 But Ithaca Trust did not
expressly extend its reasoning to every case involving deductions
from the taxable estate, thereby opening the issue of whether its
narrow holding should apply to deductions for claims other than
charitable contributions against estates. 35
Only months after the decision in Ithaca Trust, Jacobs v.
6
CommissionerN
was brought before the Eighth Circuit. In Jacobs,
the widow elected to receive money from the decedent's will in lieu
of her prenuptial agreement amount. 37 The estate wanted to

29. Loeb, supra note 1, at 6.

30. Ithaca Trust v. United States, 279 U.S. 151 (1929).
31. Id. at 154.
32. The wife died only six months after the decedent; consequently, it was
feasible to calculate the deduction based on the actual facts in the case. Id. at
155. However, the Court noted in its decision that "[t]he first impression is
that it is absurd to resort to statistical probabilities when you know the fact.
But this is due to inaccurate thinking ....

Tempting as it is to correct

uncertain probabilities by the now certain fact, we are of the opinion that it
cannot be done." Id. One theory suggests that Ithaca Trust was decided on
the principle that "[a] call for absolute certainty would doom the charitable
deduction in all cases, for there is no such thing." Leo L. Schmolka, Income
Taxation of Charitable Remainder Trusts and Decedents' Estates: Sixty-Six
Years of Astigmatism, 40 TAx L. REV. 1, 21-22 (1984).
33. Ithaca Trust, 279 U.S. at 155.
34. Brown, supra note 13, at 588. It is important to note that Ithaca Trust
involved a deduction under I.R.C § 403(a)(3) of the Revenue Act of 1918 (the
predecessor to I.R.C. § 2055) and not a deduction under I.R.C § 403(a)(1) (the
predecessor to I.R.C. § 2053). Vecino, supra note 10, at 15. Consequently,
some courts declined to extend the holding of Ithaca Trust beyond deductions
under § 2055. Id. See, e.g., Comm'r v. Shively, 276 F.2d 372, 374 (2d Cir.
1960) (asserting that the ruling in Ithaca Trust was very narrow and therefore
only controlled cases concerning charitable deductions).
35. Shively, 276 F.2d at 374.
36. Jacobs v. Comm'r, 34 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1929).
37. Id.
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deduct the prenuptial agreement amount in accordance with the
reasoning of Ithaca Trust because it was a date-of-death claim
against the estate. 38 The Eighth Circuit acknowledged Ithaca
Trust, but distinguished the case before it by claiming that Ithaca
Trust only applied to charitable deductions. 39 The court held that
the language of the Code 40 allowed for postmortem events to be
taken into consideration. 4 1 Following the Eighth Circuit's refusal
in Jacobs to apply Ithaca Trust beyond the scope of charitable
deductions, 42 a split of authority quickly developed among several
43
circuits, each aligning itself with the decision in either case.
More than fifty years after Jacobs caused the split, Propstra
v. United States44 complicated the issue further.45 Propstra
considered whether a taxpayer was entitled to deduct the full
amount he owed a real estate organization as of his date of death
despite having later settled the claim for a lesser amount. 46 The
Ninth Circuit ruled unequivocally that "as a matter of law, when
claims are for sums certain and are legally enforceable as of the
date of death, postmortem events are not relevant in computing
the permissible deduction." 47 The court went on to note, however,
that postmortem events would be relevant for disputed or

38. Id. at 236.
39. Id.; see Estate of Sachs v. Comm'r, 856 F.2d 1158, 1161 (8th Cir. 1988)
(reiterating its assertion in Jacobs that Ithaca Trust only governs in cases
relating to charitable deductions).
40. The Court specifically referenced I.R.C. § 403(a) of the Revenue Act of
1918, which was the predecessor to I.R.C. § 2053(a).
41. Jacobs, 34 F.2d at 236. The rationale was based on the fact that
"claims against the estate" were deductible under the same section as funeral
and administration expenses, which do not exist at the time of death and thus
need to be determined by postmortem events. Id. Interestingly, the Supreme
Court ultimately denied certiorari in Jacobs. Jacobs v. Comm'r, 34 F.2d 236
(8th Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 603 (1929). Some found that this
supported the notion that Ithaca Trust did in fact only apply to charitable
deductions and not to claims against the estate (as the Jacobs court reasoned).
McEowen, supra note 15.
42. Brown, supra note 13, at 590.
43. See Comm'r v. Strauss, 77 F.2d 401, 405 (7th Cir. 1935) (allowing
deduction of date-of-death balance due from decedent on promissory note and
ignoring lender's postmortem failure to present a state court claim for
payment). But see Comm'r v. State St. Trust Co., 128 F.2d 618, 622 (1st Cir.
1942) (disallowing deduction for present value of monthly amounts due to
former spouse under divorce decree because of a postmortem compromise of
amount due); Shively, 276 F.2d at 375 (disagreeing with "cases that state that
subsequent events are to be ignored even when they render the claim entirely
unenforceable in the probate proceeding settling the estate").
44. Propstra v. United States, 680 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1982).
45. Vecino, supra note 10, at 15.
46. Propstra,680 F.2d at 1253.
47. Id. at 1254.
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contingent claims. 48 This assertion broadened the scope of the
issue and drew a distinction between sums "certain" and sums
"uncertain" at the date of death. 49
The Fifth Circuit's leading case, 50 Estate of Smith v.
Commissioner,51 also adheres to the Ithaca Trust line of cases but
distinguishes itself from Propstra'streatment of sums "uncertain."
In Smith, the decedent's estate ultimately settled a claim brought
against it for less than the original amount of the claim. 52 The
court nonetheless held that the claim must be valued as of the
date of death and "must [be] appraised on information known or
available up to (but not after) that date." 5 3 In its decision, the
Smith court explicitly rejected the distinction drawn by the Ninth
Circuit in Propstra between sum certain and sum uncertain
claims, holding that no distinction is drawn in I.R.C. § 2053(a)(3)
or Ithaca Trust.54 As part of its reasoning, the Fifth Circuit noted
that "since Ithaca Trust, Congress has thrice reenacted the entire
Internal Revenue Code 55 and has made countless other
modifications to the statute, but has never seen fit to overrule
Ithaca Trust legislatively."5 6 Smith is significant because it
"extends the reach of the Ithaca line of case law" to cases where

48. Id. The court relied on Estate of DuVal v. Comm'r to justify its position.
4 T.C. 722 (1945), aff'd, 152 F.2d 103 (9th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 838
(1946). DuVal denied a deduction of a contingent liability because it had
become unenforceable when the bank agreed to look only to the primary
debtor and not the decedent. Id. at 725. Some have suggested, however, that
because Duval lacks any "real precedential value," the court's assertion in
Propstra that postmortem events are relevant regarding disputed or
contingent claims "appears to be nothing more than judicial contrivance."
Loeb, supra note 1, at 10.
49. Vecino, supra note 10, at 15. In just over a year after Propstra, the
Ninth Circuit addressed the question of whether a spousal support obligation
was a "sum certain" in Estate of Van Horne v. Commissioner, 720 F.2d 1114
(9th Cir. 1983). The court reiterated its support for Ithaca Trust and provided
the rule that a "claim that is actuarially valued is not uncertain for estate tax
purposes." Van Horne, 720 F.2d at 1116.
50. Vecino, supra note 10, at 15.
51. Estate of Smith v. Comm'r, 198 F.3d 516 (5th Cir. 1999).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 517.
54. Loeb, supra note 1, at 11. In Smith, the court stated "[t]here is only a
semantic difference between a claim that may prove to be invalid and a valid
claim that may prove to have a value of zero." Smith, 198 F.3d at 525. The
Smith court tried to reconcile its decision with Propstra by labeling its
assertion relating to uncertain claims as "dicta." Loeb, supra note 1, at 12.
55. Ithaca Trust Co., 279 U.S. 151 (1929) (deciding Ithaca Trust under the
Revenue Act of 1918). The tax statutes were recodified by Acts of Congress in
1939, 1954, and 1986.
56. Smith, 198 F.3d at 524.
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the claim is uncertain. 57 Other circuits that follow the Ithaca
Trust line of reasoning include the Tenth 58 and Eleventh
Circuits, 59 both of which cite to Propstra.
On the other side of the split are the circuits that follow the
Jacobs line of reasoning. In 1988, the Eighth Circuit again
addressed the Jacobs rule in Estate of Sachs v. Commissioner.60 In
Sachs, after the decedent had made net gifts of stock to irrevocable
trusts, the estate paid the income tax and deducted the amount as
a claim against the estate. 61 Subsequently, Congress forgave the
income tax liability under the Tax Reform Act of 1984.62 The
Eighth Circuit denied the deduction on the ground that the new
legislation made the claims "disappear,"63 and therefore the
deductions were no longer valid. 64 The court reasserted its
reasoning in Jacobs by emphasizing that Ithaca Trust only applies
to the valuation of charitable bequests, and the public policy of
providing certainty in situations involving charitable bequests
exists to stimulate charitable giving, but no such reason exists in
valuing claims against the estate. 65 The Eighth Circuit is joined
by the First Circuit, 66 the Second Circuit, 67 and the Service 68 in
57. Loeb, supra note 1, at 11.
58. See Estate of McMorris v. Comm'r, 243 F.3d 1254 (10th Cir. 2001)
(refusing to consider postmortem events that reduced a deduction for income
tax liabilities after the income taxes were refunded to the estate as a result of
unrelated events). The court also discussed that policy reasons prompt the
adoption of the date-of-death line of reasoning because "this principle provides
a bright line rule which alleviates the uncertainty and delay in estate
administration." Id. at 1261.
59. See O'Neal v. United States, 258 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2001) (aligning
with the cases that follow Ithaca Trust). Notably, O'Neal was remanded for a
recalculation of the date-of-death values, suggesting that the courts are not
bound to Form 706 values as filed. See Larry Maples, Post-Death Events and
Valuation
of
Claims,
CPA
J.,
Nov.
2003,
available
at
http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2003/1103/dept/dll5OO3.htm
(discussing
the background relating to the judicial split).
60. Sachs, 856 F.2d at 1160.
61. The estate filed the deduction under I.R.C. § 2053(a)(3). Id. at 1159.
62. The Tax Reform Act of 1984 provided that the income tax paid by the
donees on a net gift is not includible in the taxable income of the donor. Tax
Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 1026, 98 Stat. 494, 1031 (1984).
63. Sachs, 856 F.2d at 1160.
64. The Eighth Circuit reversed the Tax Court's decision, which upheld the
taxpayer's position that the tax liability was deductible as a claim against the
estate despite the fact that subsequent legislation forgave the tax liability. Id.
65. Sachs, 856 F.2d at 1160. The Sachs holding directly contradicts the
Tenth Circuit's holding in McMorris, despite their similar fact scenarios.
Vecino, supra note 10, at 16; see also John Zimmerman, Claims Against the
Estate: A Continuing Controversy, 10 TAX MGMT. EST. GIFTS & TR. J. 65, 66
(1985) (observing that certain courts distinguish Ithaca Trust because it
involved charitable deductions).
66. See State St. Trust v. Comm'r, 128 F.2d 618 (1st Cir. 1942) (allowing
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support of the Jacobs line of reasoning. 69
In the almost eighty years since Ithaca Trust and Jacobs, the
Supreme Court has declined to rule on the issue despite the
discrepancies among the circuits. 70 In order to finally resolve the
circuit courts of appeals' seemingly unfair disparate applications of
tax laws relating to claims against the estate, the Service issued
Proposed Regulations as a complement to section 2053.71 The goal
of the Proposed Regulations is to create a fair and effective
administration of the tax laws. 72 Despite their objectives, the
postmortem events to be taken into account in valuing the deductible claim).
In State Street Trust, the wife filed a claim against the estate of her deceased
husband for payment of the amounts due to her under the divorce decree. Id.
at 619. Later, the probate court approved a compromise agreement for the
liquidation of the claim by paying a sum in cash and monthly payments as
long as she lived and remained unmarried. Id. The First Circuit held that the
Tax Board should consider the possibility of the wife's remarriage when
determining the value of the deduction by the decedent's estate. Id. at 622.
67. See Shively, 276 F.2d at 375 (disagreeing with "cases that state that
subsequent events are to be ignored even when they render the claim entirely
unenforceable in the probate proceeding settling the estate").
68. The Service aligns itself with the Jacobs line of reasoning in advocating
for postmortem events to be used to value contingent and contested claims.
See Maples, supra note 59 (discussing the arguments for both sides of the
issue). One reason for the Service's position is that permitting estates to
deduct claims that will not be paid "constitutes windfall in certain cases."
William L. Raby & Burgess J.W. Raby, Post-Death Events and Claims Against
Estates, 91 TAX NOTES 105, 106 (2001).
69. Another significant case on the issue is Kyle v. Commissioner, 94 T.C.
829, 850 (1990). In Kyle, the court drew a distinction between the issues of
valuation and enforceability of a claim. The court held that there "appear[ed]
to be two broad categories of cases that have considered post-death events: (1)
[c]ases concerning the valuation of claims that are certain and enforceable at
the time of death and (2) cases concerning the enforceability of disputed or
contingent claims against the estate." Id. at 849. Thus, the court blended the
elements in the two lines of reasoning and offered the position that courts
should consider postmortem events in determining validity of claims but not in
determining their valuation. Id.
70. See, e.g., Jacobs, 34 F.2d at 236; DuVal, 4 T.C. at 725-26; Van Horne, 78
T.C. at 736. In 2001, Congress passed legislation that phases out the estate
tax and ultimately eliminates the tax in 2010. See Economic Growth and Tax
Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16 § 501(a), 115 Stat. 38, 69
(eliminating the estate tax through annual reductions). The Act will abolish
the estate tax as of 2010, but unless it is extended by an act of Congress, the
estate tax will automatically be reinstated in 2011. See id. § 901 (expressing
the "sunset" provisions for the estate tax repeal). Consequently, it is not likely
that the Supreme Court will address the issue of deductions involving claims
against the estate until the future of the estate tax is more certain. See
Brown, supra note 13, at 584 (discussing probable judicial or congressional
action).
71. Prop. Regs. §§ 20.2053(1-9), 72 Fed. Reg. 20080-87; see also Cloud,
supra note 25 (discussing the rationale behind the Proposed Regulations).
72. Prop. Regs. §§ 20.2053(1-9), 72 Fed. Reg. 20080-87.
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Proposed Regulations fail to address the issues fully, leaving the
door open to further discussion on the topic.
III.
A.

ANALYSIS

The IRS Takes Action

The Proposed Regulations lay out basic rules that would
govern the deductibility of expenses and claims against the estate
In general, the Proposed Regulations
under section 2053.73
purport that events occurring after a decedent's death are to be
74
considered when determining the deductible amount.
The most significant change under the Proposed Regulations
is the limit on the deductibility of claims against the estate.
Essentially, deductions under section 2053 are limited to amounts
actually paid by the estate in satisfaction of deductible expenses
and claims.7 5 In order to be deductible, the claim must: (A)
represent personal obligations of the decedent existing at the time
of the decedent's death, (B) be enforceable against the decedent's
estate at the time of payment, 76 and (C) actually be paid by the
77
estate in settlement of the claim.

73. The Proposed Regulations amend multiple provisions of section 2053.
This Comment will only address the segments of the Proposed Regulations
that govern the deductibility of claims against the estate. See Prop. Reg. §
20.2053-1(b)(2), 72 Fed. Reg. 20082 (stating that final court decisions as to the
amount and enforceability of the claim will be accepted in determining the
amount deductible as long as the amount is paid or meets the requirements
for estimated expenses); Prop. Reg. § 20.2053-1(b)(3), 72 Fed. Reg. 20083
(stating that settlements will be accepted if they are reached in bona fide
negotiations between adverse parties with valid claims recognizable under
applicable law, and if they are not inconsistent with applicable law); Prop.
Reg. § 20.2053-1(b)(5), 72 Fed. Reg. 20083 (stating that a deduction is not
allowed to the extent the expense or claim is compensated for by insurance or
is otherwise reimbursed).
74. Despite the recent trend by the circuit courts to favor date-of-death
valuations of claims against the estate, the Service rejected the reasoning
behind such cases. In the preamble to the Proposed Regulations, the Service
asserts that the date-of-death approach is inefficient and expensive for both
the taxpayer and the government. 72 Fed. Reg. 20081; see also Akers, supra
note 21, at 2 (discussing the rationale behind the Proposed Regulations).
75. Prop. Reg. § 20.2053-1(b)(1), 72 Fed. Reg. 20082.
76. Decidedly, the term "enforceable" is ambiguous, creating a potential
debate as to its precise meaning. See Jonathan G. Blattmachr & Diana S.C.
Zeydel, Prop. Regs. on the Deduction for Administration Expenses and Claims,
34 EST. PLAN. 3, 12 (2007) (discussing the modifications under the Proposed
Regulations and the potential consequences).
77. If the amount of liability is not ascertainable before the period of
limitations for claims of refund expires, the estate may file a protective claim
for refund in order to preserve its right to claim a refund. The protective claim
must satisfy two requirements: (1) it must identify the outstanding liability or
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The Proposed Regulations also assert that an estate may not
take deductions on estate tax returns for claims that are potential,
unmatured, or contested at the time the return is filed. 78 An
estate may file a protective claim to preserve its right to receive a
tax refund, but only to the extent the estate ultimately pays the
79
pending claim.
Another important modification by the Proposed Regulations
is the new treatment of recurring payments that will extend
beyond the period for final determination of the estate tax
liability.80 If an estate has an outstanding recurring payment that
is not subject to a contingency, it may deduct the present value of
the payments as of the date of the decedent's death.8 1 As to
recurring payments subject to contingencies, the Proposed
Regulations limit the deduction to the amounts ultimately paid.8 2
claim that would have been deductible under § 2053(a) had the liability
already been paid, and (2) it must describe the reasons and contingencies
delaying the determination of the liability or the actual payment of the claim.
See generally Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-2 (1967) (stating the requirements for
claims for a credit or refund).
It is important to note that the requirements for a protective claim
under the Proposed Regulations need clarification. The Final Regulations
would need to address "whether a protective claim would be filed in the same
manner as any other claim for refund or whether a different procedure is
contemplated." Comments Concerning Proposed Regulations Relating to
Deductions for Claims Against an Estate under Section 2053, AM. B. ASS'N
SEC. OF TAXATION, July 24, 2007, at 10 [hereinafter Comments Concerning
Proposed Regulations]. The final Regulations must also offer guidance as to
the time period in which the estate has to notify the Commissioner following
the removal of the contingency. Id.
78. Prop. Reg. § 20.2053-4(b)(1-2), 72 Fed. Reg. 20084.
79. See supra note 77 (noting the two requirements for filing protective
claims). Despite the availability of the protective claim to protect the estate's
right to claim a later deduction, it is important to note that the Proposed
Regulations also state that claims that are unenforceable prior to death or
before they are actually paid are not deductible even though the estate pays
the claim. Prop. Reg. §20.2053-4(b)(5), 72 Fed. Reg. 20085.
80. Prop. Reg. § 20.2053-4(b)(7), 72 Fed. Reg. 20085. Examples of recurring
payments are loan repayments or divorce decrees.
81. Id. The present value of the payments would be measured through the
valuation rules of I.R.C. § 7520. An example of a recurring noncontingent
payment would be a divorce decree whereby the estate is obligated to make
annual payments of $20,000 for a period of ten years. If the decedent dies two
years later after making only two payments, the estate can take a deduction
for the present value of the $80,000 remaining claim against the estate.
82. Prop. Reg. § 20.2053-4(b)(7), 72 Fed. Reg. 20085. An example of a
recurring contingent payment would be a divorce decree whereby an estate is
obligated to make annual payments of $20,000 for the sooner of a period of ten
years or the death of the former spouse. Here, it is not certain that the estate
will necessarily make ten payments. If the decedent dies after making only
two payments, the estate would not be permitted to take a deduction for the
remaining payment obligations.
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A deduction is allowed only as each payment is made.8 3
A final significant change to section 2053 under the Proposed
84
Regulations is the treatment of claims by family members,
85
related entities, or beneficiaries. Proposed Regulation section
20.2053-4(b)(4) states that claims by family members, related
entities, or beneficiaries of a decedent's estate will be strictly
scrutinized to ensure that they are legitimate claims.8 6 This
Proposed Regulation suggests that there is a rebuttable
presumption that claims by such parties are not legitimate or bona
fide, and therefore not deductible. The estate is responsible for
providing evidence to overcome the presumption against such
87
claims before it can take a deduction.
B. Potential Shortcomings of the ProposedRegulations
In the Preamble to the Proposed Regulations, the Service

Notably, a higher deduction may ultimately result for contingent claims
because the amount will be deductible at face value, instead of the present
value as of the date of death. Blattmachr & Zeydel, supra note 76, at 13.
The Proposed Regulations also include a provision stating that if a commercial
annuity is purchased to satisfy a recurring obligation on an enforceable claim,
the estate can deduct the sum of the amount paid for the commercial annuity,
regardless of whether the claim is contingent. Prop. Reg. § 20.2053-4(b)(7)(ii),
72 Fed. Reg. 20085.
83. Prop. Reg. § 20.2053-4(b)(7), 72 Fed. Reg. 20085. If the amount of the
liability will not be paid or is not ascertainable with reasonable certainty by
the expiration of the applicable period of limitations, the estate must properly
preserve the claim for refund by filing a protective claim. See supra note 77
(noting the two requirements for filing protective claims).
84. Prop. Reg. § 20.2053-4(b)(4) states that family members include "the
spouse of the decedent; the grandparents, parents, siblings, and lineal
descendants of the decedent or of the decedent's spouse; and the spouse and
lineal descendants of any such grandparent, parent, and sibling. Family
members include adopted individuals." 72 Fed. Reg. 20084-85.
85. Prop. Reg. § 20.2053-4(b)(4) defines a related entity as:
An entity in which the decedent, either directly or indirectly, had a
beneficial ownership interest at the time of the decedent's death or at
any time during the three-year period ending on the decedent's date of
death. Such an entity, however, shall not include a publicly-traded
entity nor shall it include a closely-held entity in which the combined
beneficial interest, either direct or indirect, of the decedent and the
decedent's family members, collectively, is less than thirty percent of the
beneficial ownership interests (whether voting or non-voting).
72 Fed. Reg. 20084-85.
86. Id. The rationale behind the new provision is to prevent family
members and beneficiaries from using the claim against the estate deduction
to bypass the gift tax system.
87. "Evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption may include evidence
that the claim arises from circumstances that would reasonably support a
similar claim by unrelated persons or non-beneficiaries." Prop. Reg. §20.20534(b)(4), 72 Fed. Reg. 20084-85.
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detailed its reasoning behind the changes to section 2053.88 The
Preamble states that the Treasury Department and the Service
came to their conclusions after carefully considering the many
judicial decisions on the issue,8 9 the legislative history of section
2053,90 and various methods to furthering its goal of "effective and
fair administration of the tax laws." 91 The actual payment
approach is generally more favorable to the Service's position 92 in
that it "prevent[s] estates from arguing for a high date-of-death
value of a claim against the estate despite an actual settlement
However, an
and payment of a much lower amount." 93
examination of the public policy considerations and practical
consequences of the Proposed Regulations reveals many
inconsistencies and inefficiencies resulting from the provisions.
A significant issue that may arise under the Proposed
Regulations is that the estate may encounter liquidity problems.
88. 72 Fed. Reg. 20080.
89. The Service reaffirmed its support for Jacobs and its progeny. 72 Fed.
Reg. 20081-82.
90. Notably, the preamble does not explicitly reference the legislative
history that it refers to in support of its "actual payment" approach. See
Akers, supra note 21, at 2 (discussing portions of the preamble to the Proposed
Regulations).
91. 72 Fed. Reg. 20081. The Service notes that § 2031(a) explicitly
requires that the decedent's assets be valued as of the date of death, but that §
2053 is lacking such an instruction. However, "[t]he lack of a statutory
requirement to value claims against the estate as of the date of the decedent's
death may well be a result of the structure of I.R.C. § 2053(a), rather than
some specific congressional intent that date-of-death values should not be
used." Press Release, Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Acct., Comments on Section
2053 Proposed Regulations (REG-143316-03) Regarding How Post-Death
Events May Be Considered in Determining the Value of a Taxable Estate
(Aug. 8, 2007), available at http://tax.aicpa.org/NIrdonlyres/1982F8EB-99E7485A-A94E-DC33D319BAA/0/2053_regs-comments_08_08 07
final tojIRS.doc.
Section 2053(a) states four categories of items that are deductible.
I.R.C. § 2053(a). Two of the items, funeral expenses in § 2053(a)(1) and
administrative expenses in § 2053(a)(2), cannot be valued at the date of death.
Therefore, it would be impossible to impose by statute that all four categories
should be valued at the date of death. It is important to note that funeral and
administrative expenses could be valued within a short period of time
following the death of the decedent, and usually within the time that it takes
to complete administration of the estate.
92. The basis for the Service's argument is that using the date-of-death
value requires the taxpayer and the Service to retry the substantive issues
underlying the claims against the estate in the context of the tax issue. The
Service argues that this approach is expensive in both appraisal and litigation
Also, the date-of-death valuation frequently
costs. 72 Fed. Reg. 20081.
compels the taxpayer to take contradictory positions on the estate tax return
and in the substance of the court pleadings. Prop. Reg. § 20.2053(1-9), 72 Fed.
Reg. 20080-87.
93. Akers, supra note 21, at 6.
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An estate involved in a claim that is contested, contingent, or
unmatured is prohibited from taking a deduction for such a claim
until the claim is actually paid. 94 Essentially, the estate would be
required to pay the estate tax and later file for a refund in the
amount that would have been deductible. 95 A problem arises when
an estate does not have enough liquid assets to cover the judgment
or settlement agreement amount after it has already paid the
estate tax. 96 Estates may be forced to borrow funds to cover the
amount required to settle the claim against it. 9 7 The estate would
undoubtedly suffer significant administrative inconveniences and
would endure prejudices from the timely and costly process.98
Another related problem with the Proposed Regulations is the
potential unfairness that may result for estates involved in claims
or counterclaims in the same or related litigation. The standard
for the inclusion of assets under estate tax law99 would be
inconsistent with the standard for deducting claims against the
estate under the Proposed Regulations. Estates would be required
to value their contested claims against a third party as an asset of
the estate at the date of the decedent's death.100 The estate must
report the value regardless of whether the dispute has been
resolved by the due date for filing the estate tax form. In contrast
to the inclusion standard, the deduction standard for claims
against the estate under the Proposed Regulations prohibits the
estate from deducting the value of the contested claim against
it.101 Instead, the estate must await the resolution of the lawsuit

94, Prop. Reg. § 20.2053-4(b)(1), 72 Fed. Reg. 20084; Prop. Reg. § 20.20534(b)(2), 72 Fed. Reg. 20084; see supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text
(discussing the deductibility of contingent or contested claims under the new
Proposed Regulations).
95. The estate must properly preserve the claim for refund by filing a
protective claim. See supra note 77 (noting the two requirements for filing
protective claims).
96. The Code does include certain provisions that allow for extensions to
avoid liquidity problems. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6166 (governing extension of time
for paying estate tax where the estate consists largely of interest in a closely
held business). However, these extensions will not be applicable in every
situation and may not be adequate to effectively protect against liquidity
problems. See id. (allowing executor of estate to pay tax in subsequent years
subject to certain restrictions).
97. See Comments Concerning Proposed Regulations, supra note 77, at 6
(discussing the liquidity concerns raised by the Proposed Amendments).
98. The estate may face problems securing loans from third party lenders or
end up incurring excessive legal and administrative fees.
99. See I.R.C. § 2031(a) (defining value of gross estate to include all
property, real or personal, tangible or intangible).
100. Id. The fair market value of the claim would be included as an asset of
the estate.
101. Prop. Reg. § 20.2053-4(b)(2), 72 Fed. Reg. 20084.
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before seeking a refund. 10 2
Because it is quite common for modern lawsuits to have
counterclaims, 103 this provision of the Proposed Regulations is
particularly burdensome for the taxpayer. The potential liquidity
problems will be even more severe in disputes involving
counterclaims. Not only will the estate be barred from taking a
deduction for the claim against the estate, but it will also be
obligated to include the amount of its claim against the third party
as an asset, regardless of whether the estate ultimately receives
the estimated amount. 10 4 Without the benefit of a deduction for
the claim, the estate may not have enough liquid funds to cover
the estate tax for the potential claim against the third party.105
These inconsistent standards are unfairly burdensome for the
estate. The Service asserts that the Proposed Regulations will
reduce the retrying of cases in the tax court that result from
inaccurate valuations.10 6 Yet the Service requires the same type of
valuations for the inclusion of assets in the estate.10 7 These
standards are ideologically irreconcilable and realistically
While the Service asserts that the Proposed
unreasonable.
Regulations are based on administrative convenience and
efficiency, 0 8 "this very common situation will result in even more
complexity in light of the different approaches that will apply to
the claim and counterclaim."' 10 9
The new provisions relating to recurring payments also create
issues for the taxpayer. If an estate is obligated to make recurring
payments and that obligation is "certain," the estate is permitted
to take the deduction for the amount. 110 This is logical and
equitable, as the estate can adequately assess the net estate. But
estates are not permitted to deduct claims for contingent recurring
payments and, instead, must deduct the payments as they are
made.'
Depending on the type of recurring payment obligation,

102. The estate must properly preserve the claim for refund by filing a
protective claim. See supra note 77 (noting the two requirements for filing
protective claims).
103. Comments ConcerningProposedRegulations, supra note 77, at 6.
104. Blattmachr & Diana, supra note 76, at 11.

105. Id.
106. 72 Fed. Reg. 20081.

107. I.R.C. § 2033.
108. 72 Fed. Reg. 20081.
109. Akers, supra note 21, at 6.
110. Prop. Reg. § 20.2053-4(b)(7), 72 Fed. Reg. 20085; see supra notes 80-81
and accompanying text (explaining the rule under the Proposed Regulations
regarding the deductibility of recurring claims for "certain" sums).
111. Prop. Reg. § 20.2053-4(b)(7), 72 Fed. Reg. 20085; see supra note 82 and
accompanying text (explaining the rule regarding the deductibility of
recurring contingent claims under the Proposed Regulations).
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an estate may be forced to file for annual estate tax refunds for
decades. 112 Such situations would be highly problematic, causing
estates to possibly incur many additional costs and burdens in
filing refund claims every year. 113 Furthermore, the requirement
would prevent heirs and executors from obtaining the closure
11 4
necessary to manage the estate effectively.
Depending on the type of contingency, an accurate valuation
of the potential claim can be assessed through methods often used
by the Service under inclusion provisions. 11 5 In fact, the Service
has consistently asserted that the actuarial tables must be used to
value a stream of future payments to be included for tax
purposes. 1 6
The Service's position on contingent recurring
payments under the Proposed Regulations is inconsistent with its
position taken elsewhere regarding the estate tax.
Another shortcoming under the Proposed Regulations is the
11 7
provision regarding claims by family members and beneficiaries.
Proposed Regulation section 20.2053-4(b)(4) creates unnecessary
burdens for the estate. The current regulations and pertinent
provisions of the Proposed Regulations sufficiently guard against
the manipulation of claims used to bypass the gift and estate tax
systems. 18
For example, with regard to court decrees and

112. An important practical consequence of this provision is that claims not
subject to a contingency will take the present or discounted value deduction.
But claims subject to a contingency will receive a deduction of the full amount
when the taxpayer files the deductions in the year of payment. Thus, "[t]he
same payment stream would result in a lesser estate tax for the estate making
payments subject to a contingency." Press Release, supra note 91, at 4.
An estate with recurring contingent payments pays established
deductible liability if it purchases a commercial annuity. However, the estate
would be subjected to an additional and unnecessary "expense to achieve the
same result that applying the actuarial table achieves under other
circumstances in the IRC." Please Release, supra note 91, at 3; see also supra
note 82 (stating the deductibility of commercial annuities under the Proposed
Regulations).
113. See supra note 77 (noting the two requirements for filing protective
claims).
114. Id.
115. For example, life annuities are valued using actuarial tables. See Treas.
Reg. § 20.2031-7 (2000) (requiring the use of actuarial tables for the valuation
of ordinary annuities, as well as life and remainder interests in property to be
included in the estate).
116. Press Release, supra note 91, at 4; see, e.g., Cook v. Commissioner, 349
F.3d 850, 856 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that a lottery prize was properly valued
in accordance with annuity tables for estate tax purposes); Shackleford v.
United States, 262 F.3d 1028, 1031-32 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing the
reasonableness of annuity tables used for valuation of noncommercial
annuities for estate tax purposes).
117. Prop. Reg. § 20.2053-4(b)(4), 72 Fed. Reg. 20084-85.
118. See Comments Concerning Proposed Regulations, supra note 77, at 13
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settlement of claims, the provisions of the Proposed Regulations
require the agreements to resolve bona fide issues. 119
Furthermore, the current regulations adequately protect against
fraudulent claims by explicitly stating that "consent to payment of
a claim cannot be a cloak for a gift." 120
Given that the Service's concern is adequately addressed by
other regulations, it would create an unnecessary burden on the
estate to provide evidence overcoming the presumption that the
claim is not legitimate in cases involving family members or
beneficiaries.121 The estate must produce factual proof to validate
the claim's validity. But the rule is incomplete in that it does not
explicitly state the standard of proof required to overcome the
presumption.122 Moreover, this burden may be inconsistent with
the burden of proof provisions of section 7591.123 The Proposed
Regulation provision extends beyond the burden of proof imposed
on the taxpayer by section 7591,124 thereby creating a problem of
125
inconsistency within the Code.
In general, the Proposed Regulations fail to adequately
address the controversy over deductible claims against the estate
in an equitable and efficient manner. The inconsistent standards
created by the Proposed Regulations are likely to cause confusion
for estate planners and administrators.
Consequently, more
liability issues may arise for such parties. 126 Furthermore, the
(addressing the need to omit section 20.2053-4(b)(4) from the final
regulations).
119. Prop. Reg. § 20.2053-1(b)(2)(ii), 72 Fed. Reg. 20082; Prop. Reg. §
20.2053-1(b)(3), 72 Fed. Reg. 20082; see supra note 77, at 13 (discussing the
Proposed Regulations).
120. Prop. Reg. § 20.2053-1(b)(3), 72 Fed. Reg. 20082.
121. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text (discussing the burden on
the estate in cases involving family members or beneficiaries).
122. Blattmachr & Zeydel, supra note 76, at 13.
123. Section 7491 states that the Service bears the burden of proof on a
factual issue as long as
[a] taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual
issue; . . . the taxpayer has complied with the requirements under this

title to substantiate any item; [and] the taxpayer has maintained all
records required under this title and has cooperated with reasonable
requests by the Secretary for witnesses, information, documents,
meetings, and interviews.
I.R.C. § 7491(a)(1-2).
124. Id.
125. See Comments Concerning Proposed Regulations, supra note 77, at 13
(addressing the need to omit section 20.2053-4(b)(4) from the final
regulations).
126. Because the Proposed Regulations are likely to cause a great deal of
uncertainty in estate administration, executors may begin to take advantage
of I.R.C. § 2204. Section 2204 enables executors to better protect themselves
against potential future personal liability. Id. The increase of petitions under
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new provisions will cause many estates to remain open for years
after a decedent's death. This will not only be costly for the estate,
but it will also prevent the family and heirs of the decedent from
obtaining closure.
Additionally, the Service will face higher
administrative costs in handling a drastic increase in the number
of refunds and protective claims that are filed. In light of the
many problems that may arise when the Proposed Regulations
become effective, 127 the Service should re-evaluate and amend the
regulations before they are published in the Federal Register as
final regulations.
IV.

PROPOSAL

The Service has appropriately identified the need for
regulations in order to address the current disparate treatment of
similarly situated estates. The final regulations must promote the
fair and equitable administration of the tax laws by effectively
balancing the interests of the government with those of the
taxpayer.
A reasonable solution must weigh the Service's
legitimate concern that estate administrators will take unfair
deductions based on overvalued claims 128 against the taxpayer's
interest in a consistent rule that promotes the timely and just
administration of the estate. Ultimately, the final regulations
must present a feasible solution on a practical level and serve the
best interest of the public from a policy standpoint. 129 The
regulations should be amended to support the date-of-death
valuation for all claims against the estate. A consistent date-ofdeath valuation standard promotes the most feasible system for
estate tax administration.
A. Practicaland Public Policy Consequences
The date-of-death valuation policy would require estates to
use reasonable estimations 30 to value claims that are uncertain at
§ 2204 would undoubtedly increase the administrative burden for the
government. Press Release, supra note 91, at 6.
127. The changes will apply only to estates of individuals who die after the
publication of the Federal Register containing the Treasury's adoption of the
final regulations. Prop. Reg. § 20.2053-1(e), 72 Fed. Reg. 20083.
128. See 72 Fed. Reg. 20081 (explaining the problems of the date-of-death
valuation approach).
129. Both the taxpayer and the government agree that there is a
considerable policy rationale for allowing estates to take estate tax deductions.
130. The Proposed Regulations would allow a deduction "for a claim that
satisfies all applicable requirements even though its exact amount is not then
known, provided that the amount is ascertainable with reasonable certainty,
and will be paid." Prop. Reg. § 20.2053-1(b)(4) (2007), 72 Fed. Reg. 20083
(2007). Yet the Proposed Regulations do not offer any guidance as to what is
a "reasonable certainty." See Press Release, supra note 91 (discussing the
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the time of death. One criticism of this standard is that inaccurate
estimations have led to the overvaluation of deductions. 13 1 But
estimates are an unavoidable mechanism for the effective
administration of the estate tax. 132 When estate administrators
file estate tax returns, they must value every asset in the estate in
order to determine the total assets. 33 Administrators must
frequently use estimations as the basis for values of items to be
included in the estate." 4 There are a number of methods by which
reasonable estimations can be calculated. The use of actuarial
tables and experts has been a long-standing policy of the Service
5
and administrators alike."3
Furthermore, while the Proposed Regulations prevent the
estate from using estimates to value claims against the estate, the
Service requires administrators to make the same type of
estimated valuations when calculating claims to be included as
assets in the estate." 36 Even where the estate has an interest in a
contingent claim, it must nonetheless value the claim based on
reasonable estimations as of the date of death, so it can be
137
included as part of the estate's assets.
In order to promote equitable public policy, this same
standard should also be applied to the deductibility side of the
The date-of-death valuation standard for both
estate tax."38
includable and deductible assets and claims is fair because both
the taxpayer and the government are subjected to the same risk.
problem of the Proposed Regulations' wording).
131. See 72 Fed. Reg. 20081 (explaining the problems of the date-of-death
valuation approach).
132. See Press Release, supra note 91, at 6 (discussing the use of estimates
throughout the estate tax regime). The facts and circumstances for each and
every taxpayer should be analyzed using fair and reasonable estimates known
at the time of death.
133. Treasury Regulation section 20.2031-1(b) (as amended in 1965) provides
that "[t]he value of every item of property includible in a decedent's gross
estate ... is its fair market value at the time of the decedent's death." The
fair market value, for purposes of the estate tax, "is the price at which the
property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller,
neither being under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having
reasonable knowledge of relevant facts." Id.
134. For example, in valuing family limited partnerships or closely held
businesses, many similar contingencies will arise and the estate must value
the asset based on estimates. Press Release, supra note 91, at 5.
135. See supra notes 115-116 and accompanying text (discussing the regular
use of actuarial tables for federal income, gift, and estate tax purposes).
136. See supra notes 99-109 and accompanying text (discussing the
inconsistent requirements for the valuation of includable and deductible
claims).
137. Id.
138. See Comments Concerning Proposed Regulations, supra note 77, at 5
(addressing the need for consistent valuation standards).
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In some situations, a date-of-death deduction value may be higher
than the amount that the estate actually paid, and thus the
taxpayer may receive a deduction greater than it is entitled to.139
Yet the estate may also take a deduction for a value lower than the
amount it ultimately pays, in which case the estate has lost the
benefit of a higher deduction. 140 Certain assets and claims may be
overvalued, while others may be undervalued. If the date-of-death
valuation standard is applied consistently for both includable and
deductible assets and claims, then all parties will share the risk
and the benefits of an inaccurate estimation.
Moreover, there are practical safeguards that prevent the
taxpayer from unreasonably inflating the claim against the estate
in order to seek a higher deduction. Through an audit, the Service
4
has the opportunity to dispute the value of a deduction.' '
Because administrators know that they may face such a challenge
if the values are unreasonable, administrators have a strong
incentive to report accurate estimates. Additionally, an estate
that is actively involved in defending a claim will not want to
increase its potential liability by overvaluing the claim on its
estate tax return. 142 These considerations are likely to deter
estates from overvaluing deductible claims against the estate.
The date-of-death valuation approach will reduce delay and
uncertainty in estate administration, 43 as well as provide family
members and heirs with necessary closure.
The practical
consequences of preventing an estate from handling its affairs in a
timely manner are significant. Certain estates will be forced to

139. For example, an estate may value an adverse claim at one million
dollars and consequently take a one million dollar estate tax deduction. If,
however, a judgment is rendered against the estate for two million dollars, the
estate cannot later amend the deduction to two million.
140. This example can also be applied to the valuation of includable assets.
See DeMaris, supra note 10, at 2 (noting that claims may be undervalued,
resulting in lower deductions for taxpayers).
141. During an audit, the Service can contest the accuracy of a valuation.
The value can then either be amended, if all parties agree upon a value, or the
parties can resolve the discrepancy in the tax court. See supra note 92 (noting
the Service's argument that the taxpayer and the Service must retry the
substantive issues in the tax court).
142. The Service highlights this issue as a shortcoming of the date-of-death
valuation approach because the taxpayer may be forced to take contradictory
positions. 72 Fed. Reg. 20080.
Yet this will force estates to make fair
assessments of their claims.
143. See McMorris, 243 F.3d at 1261-62 (commenting that definitive rules
bring "more certainty to estate administration, an ideal which has long been
promoted by judge and commentator alike"). See also Brown, supra note 13, at
604 (arguing that a "hard and fast" rule applicable to valuation
determinations is a more efficient solution).
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remain open for decades, 14 significantly increasing the costs for
the estate administration. Further, the Service will likely become
burdened by the increase in the number of refunds and protective
claims that are filed on an annual basis. 145 This will create
additional costs and administrative inconveniences for the
Service. 146
A date-of-death valuation approach will avoid
unnecessary delays and promote the efficient administration of
estates.
There is also a strong public policy argument that favors the
timeliness of the date-of-death valuation standard. Heirs and
family members need to have closure, and it is overly burdensome
for heirs to wait years before knowing the final value of their
inherited assets. 147 Family members also need to have emotional
closure. Most people do not want to be troubled with the estate
administration process after the loss of a loved one, and it would
be unreasonable to prevent families from moving on with their
lives.
B. Language of the Statutes and Regulations
Not only do the practical and public policy consequences favor
a date-of-death valuation standard, but the language of the
statutes and regulations makes a persuasive argument for the
date-of-death valuation standard. The language of nearly every
section relating to the gross estate 48 expresses that the asset
valuation is appropriate at the date of death. 49 It appears from
this explicit language that Congress determined date-of-death
valuations to be an equitable and efficient method of estate
administration.
Opponents of the date-of-death standard argue that because
144. See supra note 111 and accompanying text (discussing the potential

problem of serious delays in estate administration).
145. Press Release, supra note 91, at 7.

146. Id.
147. See id. (suggesting that it would be inequitable to force heirs into a
position where they are not able to determine the estate tax until decades
have passed after the testator's death).
148. See I.R.C. §§ 2031-2046 (governing the valuation of a gross estate).
I.R.C. § 2032, which governs alternate valuation elections, is the exception to
the date-of-death valuation standard for the determination of the value of the
gross estate. See infra note 155 (commenting that section 2032 explicitly
allows for the consideration of postmortem events).
149. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 2031 (stating in part that "[t]he value of the gross
estate of the decedent shall be determined by including to the extent provided
for in this part, the value at the time of his death of all property, real or
personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated.") (emphasis added). See
also Brown, supra note 13, at 614 (suggesting that the language of the Code is
the strongest argument against considering postmortem events when valuing
assets).
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the deduction provision for claims against the estate is included in
the same Code section as other provisions mandating
consideration
of postmortem
events,
Congress
intended
postmortem events to be a factor in valuing deductions for
claims.150 Specifically, section 2053 permits the deduction of
funeral and administration expenses, 151 which cannot be
definitively valued upon death.
This "guilt by association" 152 approach is a flawed
interpretation of the Code. Section 2053 also contains a provision
for the deduction of unpaid mortgages, a value that is
ascertainable without considering postmortem events. 153 As such,
this attempt to interpret Congress's intent using other provisions
of the same Code section is unpersuasive15 4
Congress also
expressly manifested its intent that the postmortem events should
be considered in other provisions of the Code. 155 One may infer
that if Congress had intended that postmortem events be
considered in the valuation of claims against the estate, it would
15 6
have been clear in expressing such an intention.

150. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (discussing the rationale used
by the Jacobs court in determining that postmortem events should be
considered in valuing claims).
151. See I.R.C. §§ 2053(a)(1)-(2) ("[T]he value of the taxable estate shall be
determined by deducting from the value of the gross estate such amounts (1)
for funeral expenses, [and] (2) for administration expenses.").
152. See Raby & Raby, supra note 68, at 106 (discussing the logical
inferences leading to the "guilt by association" argument). The Eighth Circuit,
in Jacobs, was the first court to adopt this "guilt by association"
interpretation.
Jacobs, 34 F.2d at 236; see also supra note 41 and
accompanying text (noting the court's analysis of the legislative intent with
regard to deductions allowable under section 2053).
153. See McMorris, 243 F.3d at 1261 (remarking that "we find it
insignificant that Congress placed funeral and estate administration expenses,
which are calculated after death, with claims against the estate in section
2053(a), because that section also contains a deduction for unpaid mortgages,
which may be calculated without reference to postdeath events").
154. See Brown, supra note 13, at 614 (suggesting that the argument against
the "guilt by association" approach is the more reasonable interpretation).
155. See Propstra,680 F.2d at 1256 (commenting that "except with regard to
matters like funeral and administrative expenses, which by their very nature
require valuation after a decedent's death, Congress has been explicit in
providing for consideration of post-death events"); see, e.g., I.R.C. § 2013
(requiring consideration of postmortem events in the calculation of credit for
tax on prior transfers); I.R.C. § 2032 (requiring consideration of postmortem
events when electing the alternate valuation of asset provision); I.R.C. § 2054
(requiring consideration of postmortem events in calculation of deductions for
casualty and theft losses during estate administration).
156. Some argue that allowing postmortem events to be considered in claim
valuation is contrary to the purpose of the estate tax, which is to tax the estate
upon death. See RICHARD B. STEPHENS ET AL., FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT
TAXATION
5.03(5)(b) (7th ed. 1997) (claiming that approaches rejecting a
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CONCLUSION

The Service's attempt to create a uniform standard by which
to determine the deductibility of claims against the estate is
inequitable and inconsistent with the positions taken elsewhere by
the Service regarding the estate tax, creating practical and public
policy concerns. The Proposed Regulations should be amended to
reflect a more feasible approach that better serves the best
interest of the public. A date-of-death valuation standard is an
appropriate means by which to value claims against the estate
because it will reduce the practical inequities and create a
consistent method for both the inclusion and deduction of assets
and claims. Date-of-death valuations will also reduce unnecessary
delay in the administration of the estate and prevent additional
costs that would likely occur if estates were forced to remain open
until all claims were finalized.
Additionally, because family
members and heirs are entitled to attain closure after their loved
one has passed, there is a strong public policy argument that
favors timely estate administration. Lastly, the language of the
Code itself is a powerful argument in favor of the date-of-death
standard. Accordingly, the final regulations should incorporate
the date-of-death approach to effectuate an efficient and equitable
estate administration process.

date-of-death standard "fly in the face of early precedent and are inconsistent
with the obvious purpose of the estate tax to measure the taxable estate at
death, except where Congress clearly elects to recognize post-death events.").

